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THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT-SIXTEEN TONS, WHAT 
Do You GET?: How Do YOU DETERMINE A MINER HAS HAD A 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CONDITION TO ALLOW A SUBSEQUENT 
CLAIM FOR BENEFITS? 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1969 the United States Congress passed the Black Lung 
Benefits Act (BLBA) in order to compensate miners who have 
been disabled by the lung disease pneumoconiosis (more commonly 
known as black lung), and their spouses and dependent children. A 
miner can apply for and receive benefits under the BLBA if the 
miner satisfies the four elements of entitlement.! Due to the pro­
gressive nature of pneumoconiosis, a miner suffering from the dis­
ease may not satisfy the elements of entitlement at their first 
application for benefits, but may be entitled to benefits at a later 
time and can reapply if there has been a "material change"2 in the 
miner's condition.3 The Director of the Office of Worker's Com­
pensation Programs (OWCP), an agency within the Department of 
Labor, has promulgated regulations that state the requirements that 
must be met in order to file a subsequent claim for benefits. These 
regulations state that in order to bring a subsequent claim for black 
lung benefits, a miner must prove that there has been a material 
1. Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.c. § 901-945 (2000). The elements of entitle­
ment require a miner to "establish[] that he or she (i) has pneumoconiosis, (ii) [t]he 
pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment, (iii) fils totally disabled, and (iv) 
[t]he pneumoconiosis contributes to the total disability." 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(d) (2006) 
(citations omitted). 
2. The phrase "material change" is a vestige of the original version of the regula­
tions governing the processing and adjudication of claims under the Black Lung Bene­
fits Act. Claims for Benefits Under Part C of Title IV of the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Act, as Amended, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,732 (Apr. 25, 1978). While the language of 
material change is not used in the current regulations, it is still used by the courts and 
relevant to the discussion. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d); see, e.g., U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. 
Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977, 979 (11th Cir. 2004); see also infra text accompanying notes 
81-110. 
3. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d). 
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change in the miner's condition with respect to one of the elements 
of entitlement previously adjudicated against the miner.4 
There has been controversy among the federal appeals courts 
as to whether the Director's standard for the filing of subsequent 
claims is proper, or whether it is too lax and does not respect the 
finality of the original judgment. Due to this split in the circuits, 
miners in different geographical locations are treated unequally 
under the same law.s This Note will explore which is the most ap­
propriate test for determining whether a miner making a subse­
quent application for black lung benefits has had a material change 
in condition since the original claim's denial. Inherent to the dis­
cussion of this issue is an analysis to determine whether the Direc­
tor's standard offends the principles of res judicata. This 
determination will be explored in the context of the scope of judi­
cial review of agency actions and regulations as dictated by the Ad­
ministrative Procedure Act and the relevant case law on that issue. 
Part I of this Note will examine the BLBA and the Department 
of Labor regulations under that Act. Also in Part I, this Note will 
delve into the area of administrative law and judicial deference to 
agency regulations, as well as the doctrine of res judicata. Part II 
will look at the cases representing the current split in the federal 
courts of appeals, and how those courts have reached their respec­
tive positions. Finally, Part III will look at the controversy and dis­
cuss whether the "one element" test is indeed the appropriate and 
applicable test for determining whether a miner has shown a mate­
rial change in condition. 
Hypothetical Fact Pattern 
Mr. Murphy, a hypothetical miner, lives and works in Wyo­
ming, a state within the Tenth Circuit, and has already been denied 
a claim for black lung benefits, as he did not meet all four elements 
of entitlement at the time of his first claim. Mr. Murphy has 
worked in a subterranean mine for ten years, and suffers greatly 
from pneumoconiosis. Though he had some symptoms and adverse 
effects from the disease at the time of his original claim, he has 
4. Id. §§ 725.202(d), 725.309(d). 
5. Compare U.S. Steel Mining Co., 386 F.3d 977 (holding that the one-element 
test was the appropriate test to determine whether a miner could bring a subsequent 
claim for benefits), with Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that the one-element test violated the principles of res judicata, and was not 
appropriate for determining whether a miner has had a material change in conditions to 
warrant a subsequent claim). 
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since become totally disabled by it. Not only can he no longer ob­
tain gainful employment, but regular activities in his every day life 
are difficult and he is almost always short of breath. In his original 
claim, elements of entitlement were decided against him. 
Now, a year after his first claim was denied, he is eligible to 
make a subsequent application for benefits if he can show a mate­
rial change in his condition. However, because he is in the Tenth 
Circuit, he will need to show a material change in all the elements 
of entitlement decided against him in his original claim. In contrast, 
if Mr. Murphy lived outside the Tenth Circuit, he would only have 
to show a material change in one of the elements of entitlement 
adjudicated against him in his original claim. Because the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has broken with its sister circuits, and 
does not apply the test adopted by the Director of the OWCP, he 
must meet the more stringent standard applied by the Tenth Cir­
cuit. Therefore, this hypothetical miner will need to persuade the 
court to abandon its material change test and adopt the Director's 
one-element test. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Black Lung Benefits Act and its Legislative History 
1. The 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 
In 1969, the United States Congress passed the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act as part of a large initiative to compen­
sate miners in the wake of a devastating mine explosion.6 This ex­
plosion brought the plight of coal miners to public attention and 
raised concern for the health and safety of miners and the well­
being of their families (specifically, their spouses and dependent 
children).7 While the explosion did not specifically bring to light 
the problem of black lung among miners, it raised public awareness 
regarding the hardships suffered by miners as a result of their work­
ing conditions; one of these hardships is pneumoconiosis.s This fed­
eral initiative to compensate miners was originally intended to 
spark action on the state level, while providing federal compensa­
tion until those states with large coal mining industries could pro­
6. H.R. REP. No. 91-563 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2503. 
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 included the first incarnation of 
the federal black lung benefits scheme. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 Stat. 742, 792-98. 
7. H.R. REP. No. 91-563, as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2503. 
8. Id. 
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vide their own funds to support miners within their state.9 
However, the state governments have not risen to the expectations 
of the federal government, and as the Director of the owep has 
yet to approve a state compensatory program, compensation for 
pneumoconiosis remains, for all intents and purposes, completely 
federal. 10 
2. The Process of Receiving Benefits 
The Department of Labor regulations provide, as a preliminary 
matter, that any person who believes that they are entitled to bene­
fits under the BLBA may apply for such benefits.11 If a miner satis­
fies the elements of entitlement, the miner is entitled to receive 
benefits payable as of the. month when total disability occurred.12 
The regulations state that any person over the age of eighteen is 
considered to be competent to file his or her own claim, but also 
provide that another person may make a claim on behalf of some­
one judged to be incompetent under the regulations,13 To make a 
claim, the claimant must either be living or must have filed an in­
tention to make a claim within six months before their death,14 In 
the latter situation, the claimant's authorized representative may 
continue with the claim in his or her stead. IS 
The Department of Labor regulations state that a claim can be 
filed by mail with any of the district offices of the Social Security 
Administration, or any office of the Department of Labor author­
ized to accept claims.16 In the case of a claimant residing outside of 
the United States, the claim may be filed with the Foreign Service,17 
A claim is considered to have been filed on the day that it was de­
livered, unless that would affect the party's rights, in which case a 
legible postmark will establish the date the claim was filed. IS A 
9. Jessica L. Toler, Note, Dead Canaries: The Struggle of Appalachian Coal Min­
ers to Get Black Lung Benefits, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 163, 178 (2002). 
10. Eric R. Olson, Note, Reducing the Overburden: The Doris Coal Presumption 
and Administrative Efficiency Under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
696, 706 (2000). 
11. 20 C.F.R. § 725.301(a) (2006). 
12. Id. § 725.503(b). 
13. Id. § 725.301(c). 
14. Id. §§ 725.301(d), 725.305(c). 
15. Id. § 725.305(a). This regulation provides that the written notice is treated as 
a claim for purposes of § 725.301, and therefore, the claim may be continued after the 
miner's death. Id. § 725.305. 
16. Id. § 725.303(a)(1). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. § 725.303(b). 
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miner may file a claim within three years of a determination that he 
is totally disabled, and there is no time limit on a survivor claim for 
benefits.19 The regulations provide a presumption that a claim was 
timely filed; however, time limits may not be waived or tolled, ex­
cept in extreme cases.2D 
A claim for benefits under the BLBA may be decided on its 
merits by a district director.21 After the determination by the dis­
trict director, a party22 has a right to a hearing on a contested issue 
of fact or law23 and a party may request such a hearing after the 
completion of proceedings before the district director.24 That hear­
ing will take place before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),2s 
within seventy-five miles of the claimant's residence,26 and will lead 
to resolution of the contested issue by the presentation of oral, writ­
ten, and documentary evidence.27 After the hearing, the judge's or­
der becomes final thirty days after it is filed, unless appealed, or 
unless the parties move for reconsideration.28 A party may also ap­
peal his or her claim to the Benefits Review Board before the deci­
sion becomes final.29 After a final order has been entered by the 
Benefits Review Board, an aggrieved party may appeal to the fed­
eral court of appeals in the circuit where the injury (exposure to 
coal dust resulting in black lung) occurred.3D 
3. Pneumoconiosis 
Because the purpose of the BLBA is to compensate miners dis­
abled by pneumoconiosis, the Department of Labor Regulations 
adopt a broad definition of this term.31 The BLBA's definition is 
substantially more inclusive than a medical definition would be,32 
19. Id. § 725.308(a). 
20. Id. § 725.308(c). 
21. Id. § 725.401. 
22. The regulations state that the following people are parties to claims made 
under the Black Lung Benefits Act: 1) the claimant, 2) an authorized representative of 
the claimant, 3) the coal mine operator, 4) any insurance carrier of the coal mine opera­
tor, and 5) the Director of the OWCP. Id. § 725.360. 
23. Id. § 725.450. 
24. Id. § 725.451. 
25. Id. § 725.452(a). 
26. Id. § 725.454(a). 
27. [d. §§ 725.455-.456. 
28. Id. § 725.479. 
29. [d. § 725.481. 
30. [d. § 725.482. 
31. 30 U.S.c. § 901 (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (2006). 
32. 30 U.S.c. § 902(b) (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a). 
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stating that pneumoconiosis is "a chronic dust disease of the lung 
and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, 
arising out of coal mine employment."33 The definition of pneumo­
coniosis found in the Department of Labor regulations closely mir­
rors the definition adopted by the U.S. Congress in the BLBA.34 
This broad definition furthers the asserted goal of Congress, which 
is to compensate miners for their injuries and aid in the support of 
their spouses and minor children.35 
4. The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 
The original 1969 statute has been amended significantly three 
times since it was passed. In 1972 Congress amended the statute to 
broaden the coverage through the introduction of an additional 
statutory presumption to aid a miner in proving the elements of 
entitlement.36 Among the biggest changes in the expansion of cov­
erage under the 1972 Amendment was the provision of benefits to 
the orphans or dependent children of a miner who died from pneu­
moconiosisY The Senate Report stated that this amendment was 
designed to correct an anomaly under the original BLBA, by which 
a child of a disabled or deceased miner, whose other parent had 
also passed, could not receive benefits under the Act, because the 
statutory language provided benefits only to a miner's widow.38 
The 1972 Amendment also added a new statutory presumption 
of entitlement under the Act. Before enacting the 1972 Amend­
ment, a presumption of entitlement attached if a miner worked in 
an underground coal mine for ten years or more, or if such a miner 
died due to pneumoconiosis after working in a coal mine for ten or 
more years, a rebuttable presumption attached that his pneumocon­
33. 30 u.s.c. § 902; see Olson, supra note 10, at 712-15. 
34. 20 c.F.R. § 718.201(a) (,"[P]neumoconiosis' means a chronic dust disease of 
the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out 
of coal employment."). The regulations make a distinction between "clinical" and "le­
gal" pneumoconiosis; however, they clearly state that the overall definition of pneumo­
coniosis encompasses both. Id. 
35. 30 U.S.c. § 90l. 
36. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 12-13 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 2305, 
2316-17. 
37. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified as 
amended at 30 U.S.c. § 922 (2000)). 
38. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 7-8, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2311-12. The 
Amendment also provides that in the absence of a widow or dependent child, benefits 
being paid to a disabled miner may be paid at his death to any dependent parents or 
siblings the miner may have. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150. 
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iosis was due to mining.39 The original 1969 Act also contained a 
third statutory presumption, based on X-ray diagnosis of a certain 
type, that pneumoconiosis was the cause of disability or death.40 In 
1972 a fourth statutory presumption was added to create a rebutta­
ble presumption of pneumoconiosis regardless of a negative chest 
X-ray if a miner had worked in an underground coal mine for at 
least fifteen years (or a surface miner working in similar conditions) 
and shows other signs or symptoms of pneumoconiosis.41 The pre­
sumption is that the miner suffers from and is disabled by pneumo­
coniosis, even if his X-ray is read as negative for the disease.42 The 
Senate Report also provides that both houses of Congress had in­
tended to allow these benefits to surface miners, who are equally as 
afflicted as underground miners, but who had been neglected by 
this program.43 This oversight was remedied by striking the phrase 
"underground" and providing benefits for all afflicted coal 
miners.44 
The 1972 Amendment also sought to increase the level of com­
pensation available to miners by broadening the definition of "total 
disability" for the purpose of black lung benefits.45 Up to this point 
the definition of "total disability" was found in Title II of the Social 
Security Act, but Congress felt the definition there was too restric­
tive and effectively denied benefits to those people intended to re­
ceive them.46 The relevant Social Security definition provided that 
total disability was an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful 
39. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 
§ 411(c), 83 Stat. 742, 793. 
40. Id. 
41. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. at 154 (codified as amended at 30 
U.S.c. § 921 (2000 & Supp. III 2003». 
42. Id. The Legislative History provides that this presumption is necessary due to 
the fact that an X-ray showing that the miner is negative for pneumoconiosis would 
preclude any further processing of a claim for benefits. Evidence of post-mortem find­
ings of black lung has urged commentators to favor less reliance on X-ray diagnoses, 
which seem to be less reliable than previously thought. As such, this provision expands 
the ability to prove pneumoconiosis by allowing other tests to establish the affliction. S. 
REP. No. 92-743, at 11-16, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2315-20. 
43. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 22-23, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2326-27. 
44. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, § 3, 86 Stat. at 153 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 30 U.S.c.). "[Allowing benefits only to underground miners] is 
grossly unfair and was not intended by the legislation passed by the Senate in 1969 .... 
The Committee amendment remedies this unfair treatment." S. REP. No. 92-743, at 22, 
as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2326. 
45. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, § 4, 86 Stat. at 153 (codified as amended at 
30 U.S.c. § 902 (2000». 
46. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 16-17, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2320. 
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activity."47 However, Congress found that in practice this kept min­
ers from receiving the benefits they were entitled to, because they 
were able to engage in gainful activity, even if not physically able to 
engage in mining.48 In many coal mining areas, there is no realistic 
opportunity for employment outside of mining, and even if there is 
an opportunity, it is rarely for comparable wages.49 As a result, 
many miners were unable to receive benefits because they could 
work, but they were unable to find work outside the mining indus­
try.50 After the 1972 Amendment, the definition of "total disabil­
ity" for black lung benefits reflected the intention that a miner who 
could no longer mine should receive the benefits provided to af­
flicted coal miners by this federal statute.51 
5. The 1977 Black Lung Benefits Reform Act 
In 1977 Congress amended the BLBA again. This time it cre­
ated the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund to better provide funding 
for the benefits program. 52 This Amendment also levied an excise 
tax on coal mining.53 The revenue raised by this tax would help pay 
benefits under the Act by funding the Black Lung Disability Trust 
Fund.54 The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and the excise tax 
on mining were needed in part because the states had not risen to 
Congress's expectation that they would formulate plans for helping 
to support disabled miners on the state level,55 Also, the Trust 
Fund shifted the primary burden of administering this benefit plan 
47. Id. at 16, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.AN. at 2320. 
48. Id. at 16-17, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.AN. at 2320-21. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, § 4,86 Stat. 150, 153 
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.c. § 902 (2000». A miner is totally disabled when 
"pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the 
skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which 
he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time." Id. 
52. Donald T. DeCarlo, The Federal Black Lung Experience, 26 How. L.J. 1335, 
1342-45 (1983). The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund was created to assume liability 
for payments due to disabled miners and survivors whose last coal mine employment 
was before January 1, 1970, when the last employment was after that date but no re­
sponsible coal operator could be found to assume liability, or if the operator responsi­
ble refused to make payments. Id. at 1343; Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-227, § 3, 92 Stat. 11, 13 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.c. § 9501(d) 
(2000». 
53. Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, § 2, 92 Stat. at 11-12. 
54. DeCarlo, supra note 52, at 1342-46. 
55. Id. at 1342-43. 
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to the coal industry, as originally intended by Congress.56 This be­
came necessary due to the Department of Labor's inability to effec­
tively distribute benefits amidst contestation by the coal 
operators.57 After the 1977 Amendment, the Black Lung Disability 
Trust Fund was responsible for the payment of black lung claims. 58 
However, coal operators sought to take advantage of the Trust 
Fund, by shifting the burden of paying claims solely to the Trust 
Fund, and away from the insurance policies purchased by the 
operators.59 
This Amendment was also an attempt to further the goal of 
compensation by removing several of the more restrictive provi­
sions, expanding the definition of the term "miner," and extending 
the statute of limitations on claims for benefits to three years from 
the date of injury.6o These changes expanded the definition of 
"miner" to include not only surface and underground miners, but 
also self-employed miners, and coal mining support staff-but only 
if they had been exposed to coal dust over the course of their em­
ployment.61 This Amendment also added a fifth rebuttable pre­
sumption-that a deceased miner who had worked for twenty-five 
years or more in a coal mine had died due to pneumoconiosis.62 It 
was clear by this Amendment that Congress preferred over-inclu­
sive compensation to under-inclusive compensation, and further ev­
idenced the intent of Congress to provide effective compensation to 
miners suffering from pneumoconiosis. 
The 1977 Amendment to the BLBA was tremendously success­
ful in increasing the number of miners who received benefits; how­
ever, it also caused numerous problems.63 The main problem was 
that this amendment left the door wide open for coal mine opera­
tors to try to shift the burden to the Black Lung Disability Trust 
56. Id. at 1343; see also S. REP. No. 92-743, at 19 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2323. 
57. DeCarlo, supra note 52, at 1343. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1346. 
60. Id. at 1343-45, 1343 n.40. 
61. Id. at 1344-45; Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 
§ 2, 92 Stat. 95, 95 (1978) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.c. § 902(d) (2000» 
('''[M]iner' means any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or 
coal preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal. Such term also in­
cludes an individual who works or has worked in coal mine construction or transporta­
tion in or around a coal mine, to the extent such individual was exposed to coal dust as 
a result of such employment."). 
62. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, § 3, 92 Stat. at 96 (1978). 
63. DeCarlo, supra note 52, at 1346. 
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Fund.64 The coal mine operators used the Trust Fund to avoid pay­
ing benefits if they were liable to a miner who was eligible for bene­
fits through the Social Security Administration.65 The coal 
operators argued that any claim that was approved by the Social 
Security Administration should be paid from the Black Lung Disa­
bility Trust Fund and not from the operator's insurance policy; a 
position largely accepted by ALJs and the Benefits Review 
Board.66 Although these concerns, among others, resulted in con­
siderable litigation, these issues were largely resolved by the 1981 
Amendment to the BLBA.67 
6. The Black Lung Benefits Amendment of 1981 
The 1981 Amendment scaled back the compensation provided 
by the BLBA, albeit only slightly. Three of the five statutory pre­
sumptions were removed, making it tougher for miners to prove 
entitlement under the Act.68 This amendment also changed the ad­
ministration of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund by transfer­
64. /d. 
65. Id. Employers also tried to place the blame for lung conditions on the miners' 
cigarette smoking. However, the rebuttable presumptions largely precluded this as a 
line of argument, and still allowed disabled miners to recover under the Act. Id. at 
1347. 
66. Id. at 1342-46. 
67. /d. at 1350-59. 
68. Id. at 1350-51. The Black Lung Benefits Act currently provides only two stat­
utory presumptions for finding entitlement under the BLBA: 
1. A miner who suffers from black lung and was employed as a coal miner for ten 
years or more enjoys the rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose 
from coal mining. 30 U.S.c. § 921(c)(1) (2000). 
2. If a miner can show a specific type of mass, by X-ray or autopsy, there shall be 
an irrebuttable presumption that he suffers from pneumoconiosis or that his death 
was caused by pneumoconiosis. Id. § 921(c)(3). 
The BLBA also provides that the following three statutory presumptions will not apply 
to claims arising after 1981: 
1. A miner who had been employed for ten or more years in a coal mine and dies 
due to respiratory dysfunction enjoys the rebuttable presumption that he died due 
to pneumoconiosis. /d. § 921(c)(2). 
2. If a miner who had been employed in the underground coal industry for fifteen 
or more years had a chest X-ray interpreted as negative for pneumoconiosis, any 
other evidence that he was afflicted with black lung attaches a rebuttable presump­
tion that he suffered from the disease. Id. § 921(c)(4) (Supp. III 2003). 
3. Any miner who died prior to the enactment of the Black Lung Benefits Reform 
Act of 1977 and was employed in the coal industry for twenty-five or more years 
enjoys the rebuttable presumption that his death was caused by pneumoconiosis. 
Id. § 921(c)(5). 
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ring control of this fund to the Internal Revenue Service.69 
Congress transferred the Trust Fund's administration because the 
Trust Fund had been operated at a deficit for many years.70 Al­
though the compensatory plan was changed slightly to make it more 
difficult to gain benefits, the intent of Congress to compensate min­
ers for their disability and to help support their spouses and chil­
dren was still clear. If Congress had intended to completely 
undercut the benefits provided, it would have removed all the statu­
tory presumptions that aid a miner in proving entitlement.71 Fur­
thermore, it was well within the power of Congress to eliminate 
these benefits altogether, a path it did not take. 
In general, the BLBA, as amended, requires coal mine opera­
tors to provide benefits for their employees who are disabled by 
pneumoconiosis.72 The Act also provides regulatory teeth by al­
lowing the Department of Labor to levy a civil penalty of not more 
than one thousand dollars for every day that the employer does not 
comply with the Act's requirements of paying benefits.73 The Act 
provides that an employer may secure the payment of benefits by 
obtaining independent liability insurance, or by becoming a self-in­
surer, qualified under the Act.74 However, the failure to obtain in­
surance from an outside source or to become a self-insurer does not 
relieve the employer of its statutory duty to provide benefits to its 
workers.75 This provision solves the problem of coal mine opera­
69. H.R. REP. No. 97-406, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2671, 
2675. 
70. Id. 
71. 30 U.S.c. § 921(c) provides that two of the five original rebuttable statutory 
presumptions are applicable to claims after 1981; the other three presumptions are not 
applicable to new claims. 
72. 30 U.S.c. § 933 (2000). This requirement applies to operators who operate a 
coal mine in a state without a workers compensation law, providing benefits to miners 
afflicted with black lung. Id. The statute requires a claim for black lung benefits be 
filed under a state workers compensation program, if one exists. Id. § 931. But as 
noted above, no state has enacted a benefits plan that has met with the approval of the 
Secretary of Labor. Olson, supra note 10, at 706. 
73. 30 U.S.c. § 933(d). 
74. Id. § 933(a). 
75. 20 c.F.R. § 726.4(b) (2006). 

The failure of any such business entity to self-insure or obtain a policy or con­

tract of insurance shall in no way relieve such business entity of its obligation 

to pay pneumoconiosis benefits in respect of any case in which such business 
entity's responsibility for such payments has been properly adjudicated. 
Id. 
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tors shifting the burden of paying black lung claims to the Black 
Lung Disability Trust Fund.16 
The BLBA as a whole is intended to compensate miners who 
are injured in the course of their job by a disease that afflicts a 
majority of career miners.17 It is also intended to aid those afflicted 
miners in the support of their families. 78 Due to the disabling na­
ture of pneumoconiosis and the fact that it will end miners' careers 
by preventing them from obtaining other gainful employment, this 
mechanism of federal and possible future state compensation is 
necessary to the welfare of this group.79 The intent of Congress is 
clear; compensation should be broad rather than narrow, and all 
those entitled should be compensated under the BLBA.80 
B. The History of the Director's One-Element Test 
The Director of the OWCP first proposed the rules containing 
the one-element test, for determining whether a miner who had 
been denied claims could bring a subsequent claim, in January of 
1997.81 To bring a subsequent claim for benefits under the BLBA, a 
miner must show a material change in his condition since the denial 
of his first claim. Under the Director's test, a material change in 
condition is shown if the miner establishes a change in anyone of 
the elements of entitlement previously adjudicated against that 
miner.82 The Director stated, in part, that the rules were meant to 
resolve the questions raised by the decision in Wyoming Fuel Co. v. 
Director, OWCP.83 
1. Why Change the Original 1978 Regulations? 
The Department of Labor felt that the one-element test was 
the proper way to determine whether a subsequent claim should be 
allowed.84 In formulating this opinion, it took into account the pro­
76. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67. 
77. 30 U.S.c. § 901; see also Olson, supra note 10, at 712-15. 
78. 30 U.S.c. § 901. 
79. [d. 
80. [d. §§ 901-945. 
81. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338, 3351-53 (proposed Jan. 22, 1997). 
82. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006). 
83. Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996); Regulations 
Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 
Fed. Reg. at 3351-52. 
84. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3353. "Paragraph (d)(4) [of 20 C.F.R. § 725.309] 
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gressive nature of black lung and stated that the "preclusive effect 
of a previous denial ... should be limited."85 This amendment to 
the previous 1978 regulations shows a change in mentality precipi­
tating this change in the rules, as the original 1978 regulations re­
quired that "a subsequent claim for benefits be denied on the 
grounds of prior denial. "86 This complete prohibition against a 
miner filing a new claim, even where a miner had a material change 
or worsened condition, received much objection. In response, the 
Department added a clause stating that the Deputy Commissioner 
could allow such claims upon finding a material change in the 
miner's condition.87 The Director felt it necessary to propound the 
amended regulations in 1997 due to the confusion and significant 
litigation over the meaning of the wording of the material change 
provision in the original 1978 regulations.88 
The Director felt that both the Tenth and Seventh Circuits 
were applying too stringent a standard in deciding the material 
change question.89 The new rules explicitly adopted the one-ele­
ment test by stating that once a miner had proven a material change 
in one of the elements of entitlement previously adjudicated against 
him, then the relitigation of issues of entitlement to benefits is no 
longer precluded.90 
2. The First Proposed Rules 
The original formulation of the proposed regulations in 1997 
went much farther than the simple institutions of the one-element 
test; it also sought to make compensation easier for a miner to ob­
tain by creating a rebuttable presumption of a material change in 
condition.91 Not only did the regulations state that a miner need 
only prove a material change or worsened condition in one of the 
elements of entitlement previously adjudicated against him, but 
upon that showing a rebuttable presumption would attach that the 
recognizes that, once a change in one of the applicable conditions [of entitlement] has 
been established, the relitigation of issues previously decided is not precluded." ld. 
85. Id. at 3352. 
86. Id. at 3351 (citing Claims for Benefits Under Part C of Title IV of the Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act, as Amended, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,743 (Apr. 25, 1978». This 
language operated to completely preclude a subsequent or duplicate claim for benefits 
under the BLBA. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 3351-52. 
90. ld. at 3353. 
91. ld. at 3352. 
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miner's physical condition had changed since the prior denial.92 
The proposed rules forbade operators from rebutting the presump­
tion by taking a position contrary to the one they adopted in the 
prior litigation.93 As such, to rebut the presumption, the coal mine 
operator or fund would have to prove that the miner's condition 
had not changed, rather than the miner having to prove that his 
condition had changed.94 
This presumption effectively shifted the burden of proof in the 
subsequent adjudication. If the miner could show a material 
change in one element of entitlement, a presumption of change 
arose. However, even if the coal operator or fund properly rebut­
ted the presumption, the claimant would still be entitled to benefits 
if he could show that his physical condition, even if it was totally 
disabling before, had significantly deteriorated since that claim.95 
A presumption not properly rebutted would require the fact-finder 
to consider all the "relevant evidence of record," including the evi­
dence from the prior litigation, to determine the claimant's entitle­
ment.96 This presumption was ultimately abandoned by the 
Director because of concerns raised by interested parties during the 
comment phase of the rulemaking. Thus, the final regulations, 
adopted in 2000, were not as they appeared in 1997. 
3. The Second Proposed Rules 
The Director of the OWCP released a second set of proposed 
rules in October of 1999, amending the 1997 proposed rules 
slightly.97 This second set of proposed rules still contained the one­
element test,98 but lacked the burden-shifting rebuttable presump­
92. [d. 
93. Id. 
[W]here the operator argued in the prior claim that the miner was not totally 
disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment, it may 
not, in an attempt to rebut the presumption of a change in the miner's condi­
tion, argue that substantial evidence in the prior claim supported a benefit 
award. 
Id. 
94. Id. "Once invoked, the presumption may be rebutted if the party opposed to 
the claimant's entitlement demonstrates that the denial of the prior claim was errone­
ous as a matter of law." Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (proposed Oct. 8, 1999) (codified as amended at 
20 c.F.R. pts. 718, 722, 725, 726, 727 (2006)). 
98. Id. at 54,968; 20 C.F.R. § 725.309 (2006). 
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tion that attached on a showing of material change in one element 
of entitlement.99 
The Director noted in this second set of proposed rules that the 
Seventh Circuit had acquiesced to the agency's position, by adopt­
ing the one-element test. IOO The Director also noted that the only 
circuit that had not deferred to the one-element test was the Tenth 
Circuit. lOl Therefore, the Director stated that the proposed rules 
"merely codifie[d] case law that is already applicable to more than 
90 percent of the claimants who apply for black lung benefits."lo2 
4. The Promulgation of Final Rules 
The Department promulgated its final set of rules, after re­
viewing the relevant comments, via publication in the Federal Regis­
ter in December of 2000.103 This pUblication represents the rules 
and regulations now codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
and stands as the body of administrative law that determines 
whether or not a miner can bring a subsequent claim for benefits.104 
These rules clearly state that in order for a miner to bring a subse­
quent claim for benefits, he need only satisfy the Director's one­
element test. lOS 
The Director again noted that the majority of federal appellate 
courts that have dealt with the issue of what a miner must show to 
establish a material change in their condition have adopted the Di­
rector's one-element test.106 The Tenth Circuit is the only circuit 
that has not adopted this test and continues, even after the promul­
gation of these final rules, to use its own test for determining a ma­
terial change in a miner's condition.107 
99. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,984. 
100. Id.; see Peabody Coal Co. v. Spese, 117 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1997). 
101. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,984. 
102. Id. 
103. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20, 2000) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 718, 
722, 725, 726, 727 (2006». 
104. Id. 
105. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309 (2006). 
106. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,968. 
107. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 89 Fed. App'x 152 (10th Cir. 
2004) (upholding the holding of Wyo. Fuel in an unpublished opinion). 
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The Director also explicitly stated that the one-element test 
does not offend the concepts of res judicata and issue preclusion. lOS 
This cuts against the Tenth Circuit's stated reason for not deferring 
to the agency's interpretation of its own regulations.109 The Direc­
tor has taken the position that the one-element test properly weighs 
the need for claim preclusion and respect for final judgments with 
the reality of pneumoconiosis being a progressive disease.uo 
C. Res Judicata 
The doctrine of preclusion rests on the notion that final judg­
ments should be respected and not circumvented lightly.111 The 
doctrine of res judicata requires a binding and final judgment 
before it will interfere with a subsequent or potential claim.112 In 
general, when a binding and final judgment is rendered, it can affect 
the parties in three ways: 1) a judgment for the plaintiff extin­
guishes the claim and merges it into the judgment; 2) a judgment 
for the defendant extinguishes the claim and bars further action on 
that claim; and 3) a judgment in favor of either party is conclusive 
between them, on the same or different claims, to the extent that 
the issue was actually litigated and determined between them. l13 
If a final and valid judgment is rendered in favor of the defen­
dant, although the claim is generally extinguished and barred by 
108. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,972-73. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 79,972-74. 
111. Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon ofAccept­
able Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 101-03 (1998). "Finality demands that, once the 
designated court decides an issue, other tribunals must respect the holding and may not 
reexamine it at the request of a disappointed litigant. ... Finality is the value served by 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel." Id. at 101-02. The term res judi­
cata, or claim preclusion, refers to the binding effect that a final judgment in one action 
affects or disallows a new action on that same claim. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY 
C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 590-91 (3d ed. 1985). The term collateral estoppel, 
or issue preclusion, refers to the effect that a final judgment in one action has in pre­
cluding a litigant from raising issues decided or not decided in one action, in future 
litigation. Id. Res judicata and collateral estoppel "[b]oth involve the conclusive effect 
of judgments in subsequent actions. The difference lies in the fact that in res judicata 
that subsequent suit involves the same cause of action, while in collateral estoppel the 
subsequent suit involves a different cause of action." MILTON D. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 234 (2d ed. 1979). 
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982). "However, for the 
purposes of issue preclusion ... 'final judgment' includes any prior adjudication of an 
issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclu­
sive effect." Id. 
113. Id. §17. 
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that judgment, there are several general exceptions to the rule of 
bar.1l4 A final and valid judgment will not bar relitigation if that 
judgment is based on: 1) "a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for 
improper venue, or for non-joinder or misjoinder of parties,"115 2) 
when a non-prejudicial non-suit is entered,116 3) "when by statute 
or rule of court the judgment does not operate as a bar to another 
action on the same claim,"117 or 4) when the judgment for the de­
fendant rests on the fact that the plaintiff's claim was premature, in 
this case the plaintiff may begin litigation again when the claim has 
matured.Hs 
Defining the scope of a "claim" is crucial to the doctrine of 
preclusion. This is because the scope of that term affects what ac­
tions can be brought and what actions are precluded by the previ­
ous litigation. When a claim is extinguished under the rules of 
merger119 and bar,12° the extinguished claim includes any and all 
rights the plaintiff would have to remedies against the defendant 
arising from the transaction or series of transactions that gave rise 
to the original cause of action litigated.121 The terms "transactions" 
and "series of transactions" are to be determined "pragmatically," 
giving consideration to how the "facts are related in time, space, 
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit and 
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expecta­
tions or business understanding or usage. "122 A claim should be 
precluded even if the plaintiff is prepared to offer different evi­
114. Id. §§ 19-20. 
115. Id. § 20(1)(a). 
116. Id. § 20(1)(b). 
117. Id. § 20(1)(c). 
118. Id. § 20(2). 
119. /d. § 18. 
120. Id. § 19. 
121. Id. § 24. 
122. Id. § 24(2). In explaining the pragmatic standard that should be used in de­
fining a claim for preclusion, the American Law Institute stated, 
[U]nderlying the standard is the need to strike a delicate balance between, on 
the one hand, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing liti­
gation to a close and, on the other, the interest of the plaintiff in the vindica­
tion of a just claim. 
In general, the expression connotes a natural grouping or common nu­
cleus of operative facts .... If there is a substantial overlap, the second action 
should ordinarily be held precluded. But the opposite does not hold true; 
even when there is not substantial overlap, the second action may be pre­
cluded if it stems from the same transaction or series. 
Id. § 24 cmt. b. 
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dence and theories of liability, or to seek different relief in the sec­
ond action.123 
D. Administrative Law and Judicial Deference 
1. 	 General Background on the Administrative Procedure 
Act 
In the 1940s, against a backdrop of rapid agency expansion, the 
United States Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).u4 This Act was passed to establish a default system of pro­
cedures and requirements that must be observed by an agency un­
less the congressional statute creating an agency provides different 
procedures or requirements. 125 The APA also replaces the tradi­
tional notions of judicial review with an explicit system of statutory 
rules of judicial review of agency actions.126 Overall, the APA em­
bodies the congressional intent of instituting a system of judicial 
review that provides aggrieved parties the right to judicial review 
but also grants deference to an agency presumably composed of ex­
perts in a particular field.127 
2. 	 Notice and Comment Rulemaking 
The APA defines the requirements an agency must follow 
when creating a rule.128 Congressionally created agencies can cre­
ate rules that apply to the public as a whole or to the community 
the agency is meant to regulate.n9 The definition of a "rule" for 
the purposes of the APA is very broad,13° but in the common un­
123. Id. § 25. 
124. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-401, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946). 
125. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596, 701-706 (2000); H. REP. No. 79-1980, at 16-18 (1946), as 
reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1195, 1204-06. 
126. 5 U.S.c. § 706. In the absence of different standards of review, made appli­
cable to an agency's action by the act of Congress establishing that agency, this section 
establishes the role of the judiciary in reviewing agency action. 
127. H. REP. No. 79-1980, at 17, as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1205; BER­
NARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 584-86 (2d ed. 1984) ("[T]wo overriding con­
siderations have combined to narrow the scope of [judicial] review [of agency action]. 
The first is that of deference to the administrative expert. . .. The second consideration 
... is that of calendar pressure."). 
128. 5 U.S.c. § 553. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. § 551. 

"[R]ule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or par­

ticular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or pre­

scribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice 

requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the 
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derstanding of the term, a rule is an agency regulation with the 
"force and effect of law."13l Most administrative rule making is ac­
complished by the mechanism of notice and comment rulemaking 
or informal rulemaking.132 Simply put, an agency must publish pro­
posed rules in the Federal Register, putting any interested parties on 
notice that the agency plans to promulgate rules.133 The agency 
must then give interested persons the opportunity to participate in 
the making of the proposed rules by allowing for the submission of 
written data and perhaps an oral hearing.134 After the period for 
comment has ended, the agency must then consider the "relevant 
matter presented" and publish the final rules in the Federal Register 
with a "concise general statement of basis and purpose."135 It has 
also become settled in the law of administrative bodies that the ju­
diciary can not require any more procedure on the part of an 
agency than found in the APA.136 
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations 
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valu­
ations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing. 
Id. 
131. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979). "In order for a regula­
tion to have the 'force and effect of law,' it must have certain substantive characteristics 
and be the product of certain procedural requisites." Id. at 301. "[T]he promulgation 
of these regulations must conform with any procedural requirements imposed by Con­
gress [in the Administrative Procedure Act, or the organic act that formed the agency]." 
Id. at 303. 
132. 5 U.S.c. § 553. The Department of Labor rules containing the Director of 
the Office of Workers Compensation Programs' one-element test were promulgated by 
this method of informal rule making. [d.; see Regulations Implementing the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338 (Jan. 22, 
1997); Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 
as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (Oct. 8, 1999); Regulations Implementing the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20, 
2000). 
133. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
134. Id. § 553(c). 
135. Id. §§ 553(c)-(d). 
136. VI. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 524 (1978). 
[5 U.S.c. § 553] established the maximum procedural requirements which 
Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting 
rulemaking procedures. Agencies are free to grant additional procedural 
rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not 
free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them. 
Id. But cf Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (imposing upon 
the agency a requirement to generate a written record of proceedings, for the purposes 
of judicial review, when the agency was not required to by the APA or its organic act). 
This limited exception to the rule of not forcing procedures on an agency is for the sole 
purpose of a court fulfilling its duty to review the validity of agency action, which is 
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The BLBA, as amended, requires that the Secretary of Labor 
prescribe appropriate regulations for the administration of the Act 
in accordance with the informal rule making process set out in the 
APA.B7 In promulgating the rules that contain the one-element 
test, the Secretary of Labor has complied with the procedural re­
quirements of the APA for notice and comment rulemaking.l38 As 
such, the Secretary's regulations are properly classified as substan­
tive rules with the force and effect of law.B9 
3. 	 Judicial Review of Agency Actions with the Force and 
Effect of Law 
The APA specifically provides how the judiciary is to review 
the actions of agencies, and when and how the judiciary can set 
those actions aside.140 When reviewing an agency action, courts 
generally apply the arbitrary or capricious standard of review.141 
Though the APA provides other grounds for invalidating an agency 
action,142 and those other grounds provide for a cumulative re­
view,143 for most notice and comment rules, it is typically the arbi­
trary and capricious standard that is applicable to determine the 
nearly impossible without a record to review. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV 
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990). 
137. 30 U.s.c. § 936(a) (2000). 
138. 5 U.S.c. § 553; Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health 
and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338 (proposed Jan. 22, 1997); Regu­
lations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as 
Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (Oct. 8, 1999); Regulations Implementing the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20, 
2000). 
139. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979). 
140. 5 U.S.c. § 706. 
141. Id. "The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action 
... found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law ...." Id. 
142. Id. 
The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action ... 
found to be ... (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immu­
nity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) un­
supported by substantial evidence in a case [of formal adjudication] or other­
wise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; (F) or 
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de 
novo by the reviewing court [when the agency's organic statute of Congress 
provides for such]. 
Id. An organic statute is a law that establishes an administrative agency. BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1449 (8th ed. 2004). 
143. Ass'n of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. V. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve, 745 F.2d 677 (D.c. Cir. 1984). Then Circuit Judge Scalia stated that "The 
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validity of agency regulations.144 Under this standard, a rule can be 
held invalid only if it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,"145 allowing 
for a judicial check on agency action that is not reasonable or in 
accord with the principles of law. The regulations containing the 
one-element test have the force and effect of law, as they were 
promulgated through a valid notice and comment rulemaking.146 
As such, these substantive rules are subject to review under the 
APA provisions for judicial review.147 
II. PRINCIPAL CASES 
A. Cases Refusing to Adopt the One-Element Test 
1. Sahara Coal Company v. OWCp148 
This was the first case heard by a federal appellate court deal­
ing with the applicable test for establishing a material change in 
condition, for the purposes of bringing a subsequent claim for black 
lung benefits. When Sahara Coal came before the court, the one­
element test had not yet been offered by the Director as an inter­
pretation of the regulations.149 The court, applying the 1978 De­
partment of Labor regulations, stated that unless the miner had 
established a "material change in condition," the subsequent claim 
was barred by the previous denial.150 
The court held that a material change in condition under the 
regulations151 meant 
'scope of review' provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.c. § 706(2), are cumulative." Id. at 683 
(citation omitted). 
144. 5 U.S.c. § 706; see also id. § 553; FLORENCE HEFFRON WITH NEIL 
McFEELEY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY PROCESS 311-13 (1983) (discussing 
the scope of review for rules made under the 5 U.S.c. § 553 notice and comment 
procedure). 
145. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
146. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006); Regulations Implementing the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20, 
2000); Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 
as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (Oct. 8, 1999); Regulations Implementing the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338 (proposed 
Jan. 22, 1997). 
147. 5 U.S.c. § 706. 
148. Sahara Coal Co. v. OWCP, 946 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1991). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 556. 
151. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d). 
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either that the miner did not have black lung disease at the time 
of the first application but has since contracted it and become 
totally disabled by it, or that his disease has progressed to the 
point of becoming totally disabling although it was not at the 
time of the first application.152 
The court also held that new evidence proffered in the second 
claim is not sufficient to establish a material changeI53 because that 
new evidence might only show that the original denial had been 
erroneous, rather than demonstrating that a material change had 
taken place, and that would constitute an impermissible attack on 
the finality of the original judgmenP54 
The Seventh Circuit plainly rebuked the Benefits Review 
Board's interpretation of the material change provision in the De­
partment of Labor Regulations.155 The Board claimed that a mate­
rial change in condition is established by "evidence which is 
relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that 
it would change the prior administrative result. "156 The court 
stated that this standard made "mincemeat of res judicata" and was 
"a plain misreading of the regulation."157 
2. Wyoming Fuel Co. v. Director, OWCpI58 
The claimant in Wyoming Fuel came before the Tenth Circuit 
on his subsequent claim for benefits, which was made in 1985.159 
The miner was denied benefits in his original claim, for failure to 
establish any of the elements of entitlement.16o The ALJ allowed 
the subsequent claim on the finding that the miner had shown a 
material change in his condition, a finding that was affirmed by the 
Benefits Review Board.161 The Wyoming Fuel Company appealed 
the award of benefits on several grounds, including a challenge to 
the standard the ALJ had used to determine whether a material 
152. Sahara Coal Co., 946 F.2d at 556 (citing Lukman v. Dir., 896 F.2d 1248, 1253 
(10th Cir. 1990)). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 556-57. 
156. Id. at 556 (quoting Spese v. Peabody Coal Co., 11 Black Lung Rptr. 1-74, 1­
76 (BRB 1988) (per curiam)). 
157. Id. at 556-57. 
158. Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996). 
159. Id. at 1504. 
160. Id. 
161. ld. 
519 2007] SIXTEEN TONS, WHAT DO YOU GET? 
change in condition had occurred.162 The Tenth Circuit rejected the 
ALl's standard as violating the principle of res judicata.163 
The Tenth Circuit did not uphold the ALl's finding that a ma­
terial change in condition had been demonstrated, holding the stan­
dard used to determine that change to be invalid. 164 However, the 
Tenth Circuit also did not agree with the other tests formulated to 
determine a material change in condition.165 They found that the 
Seventh Circuit's Sahara Coal test was flawed because it 
requires the claimant to argue against self-interest by imposing a 
duty on the claimant to persuade the court that he or she did not 
meet the elements of entitlement at the time of the prior denial, 
even though when the claimant brought the prior claim he or she 
alleged that the elements of entitlement were met.166 
The Tenth Circuit also found the Director's one-element test to 
be flawed and refused to adopt it.167 The Tenth Circuit disagreed 
with the Director, and found his standard to be flawed for four rea­
sons, three of them relating to the doctrine of claim preclusion: 1) 
The one-element test requires a claimant to prove too much, by 
showing that they meet one element of entitlement, where they 
should only need to prove that their condition has worsened, with 
respect to each element of entitlement adjudicated against them; 2) 
the Director's standard allows the claimant to present evidence not 
presented at the prior hearing; 3) by allowing a claimant to proceed 
only on the showing of a change in one element, it enables the 
claimant to relitigate the prior claim without proving a change in 
each particular element decided against them; and 4) the one-ele­
ment test unlocks the entire record once a change has been shown 
in one element of entitlement, allowing the claimant to relitigate 
that prior denial.168 
With respect to reasons one and three, it seems as though the 
court felt that the one-element test required too much proof and 
too little proof, at the same time. The Court found that the test 
required the miner to prove too much of a change in one element, 
but allowed the miner to ignore the other elements adjudicated 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 1508-09. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1509. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1510. 
168. Id. 1510-11. 
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against him, and thus would not apply the test.169 Instead, the 
Tenth Circuit formulated its own test, which requires a claimant to 
prove a material change in condition by showing a material change 
in "each element that actually was decided adversely to the 
claimant. "170 
B. Cases Adopting the One-Element Test 
1. Sharondale Co. v. Ross 171 
This was the first case in which the Director of the OWCP ad­
vocated for the one-element test for determining a material change 
in condition.172 The Sixth Circuit stated that because courts owe 
deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of that agency's 
regulations, and because the Director's standard was reasonable, 
the one-element test is the applicable test for determining a mate­
rial change in condition.173 The court held that the Director's inter­
pretation of the material change provision was reasonable, stating, 
it "takes into account the statutory distinction between a request 
for a modification of the [Benefits Review] Board's decision and a 
request for benefits based on a material change in condition."174 
2. Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow 175 
In Labelle Processing, the Third Circuit rejected the Seventh 
Circuit's Sahara Coal standard, and followed the Sixth Circuit in 
adopting the one-element test.176 The court adopted this test on the 
basis of deference owed to an agency's reasonable interpretation of 
its own regulations.177 However, the Third Circuit found the Direc­
tor's standard to be reasonable on different grounds than the Sixth 
Circuit had.178 The Third Circuit upheld the standard because it is 
in accord with the principle that "courts should liberally construe 
remedial legislation ... to include the largest number of claimants 
within its entitlement provisions. "179 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 1511. 
171. Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993 (6th Cir. 1994). 
172. Id. at 997-98. 
173. Id. at 998. 
174. Id. 
175. Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 1995). 
176. Id. at 317-18. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 318. 
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Interestingly, the Third Circuit only briefly discussed res judi­
cata, finding that if a miner establishes a material change in his con­
dition since the prior denial, a new cause of action has arisen and 
the second claim is thus not barred by res judicata.18o The court 
primarily accepted the Director's test as a matter of judicial defer­
ence to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, and the 
principle that remedial legislation should be broadly construed.181 
3. Lisa Lee Mines v. Director, OWCp182 
When Lisa Lee Mines first reached the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the court adopted the Seventh Circuit's Sahara Coal stan­
dard for determining a material change in condition.183 The Fourth 
Circuit then vacated that opinion and granted a petition for rehear­
ing en banc.184 At the rehearing the court found that the Director's 
one-element test was appropriate for determining a material change 
in condition.18s 
The Fourth Circuit chose to defer to the Director's one-ele­
ment standard as a matter of judicial deference to an agency's rea­
sonable interpretation of its own regulations, as well as a matter of 
practicality.186 The court found that the Director's standard 
"strikes a reasonable balance" between the finality of the original 
claim without subjecting a miner's health to a once in a lifetime 
adjudication.187 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's 
Sahara Coal test as they did not agree with the theory of alternative 
holdings embodied in that test, noting that by requiring a miner to 
prove a "change on every element that was previously decided 
against him," the law would be imposing the burden on the claim­
ant to "file a meaningless appeal [just] to 'correct' [ an] erroneous 
alternative holding. "188 
180. Id. at 313-14. 
181. Id. at 318. 
182. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir. 1996). 
183. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 57 F.3d 402, 407 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and 
reh'g en banc granted, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32069 (4th Cir. 1995), award of benefits 
affd, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir. 1996); see Labelle Processing Co., 72 F.3d at 317. 
184. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32069 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(en banc). 
185. Lisa Lee Mines, 86 F.3d at 1362-63. 
186. Id. at 1362 ("The Director's standard, to which we owe deference, is easily 
the most reasonable and workable of the lot."). 
187. Id. at 1363. 
188. Id. The alternative holdings idea, discussed by the court, basically addresses 
the fact that a miner may have been denied benefits on more than one element of 
entitlement in his original claim. The court exposed the flaw to the alternative holdings 
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The only argument broached by the court against the adoption 
of the one-element standard was that of the "perpetuallitigator."189 
The court dismissed this argument because the reality is that the 
black lung claims process is so slow that most miners don't have the 
time on earth to make it through two claims and thus could not 
litigate perpetually.190 
4. Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey191 
The Eighth Circuit in Lovilia Coal decided that the Director's 
one-element standard was proper on the basis of deference to an 
agency's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations.192 Fur­
thermore, the court rejected the coal company's argument that the 
. one-element standard violated due process because of its burden 
shifting.193 The court found that the coal company's argument­
that the fact presumed (material change) bears no rational relation­
ship to the fact proved (new evidence of disease or disability)­
ignores the proposition that pneumoconiosis is a progressive dis­
ease.194 The court did not discuss the competing standards formu­
lated by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, stating that even if those 
tests were reasonable, the court "would be obligated to defer to the 
Director's standard."195 
5. Peabody Coal Co. v. Spese196 
The Peabody Coal case was heard by the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals en banco The court took another look at the standard it 
had formulated in Sahara Coal. 197 The court maintained that this 
case did not represent a reversal of Sahara Coal, but merely a clari­
idea by stating "[ilf [the minerlloses on one, or two, or three elements, the end result is 
the same: a denial." Jd. This is due to the fact that a miner must prove each element of 
entitlement. Jd. To require a miner to appeal each element would be a terrible burden 
on the miner, which this court would not impose. Id. 
189. Jd. at 1364. The Fourth Circuit cast the "perpetual litigator" as a "wily" 
claimant with an equally "wily" lawyer that files claims "ad infinitum" despite lack of 
success. Id. 
190. Jd. ("Few miners have the time or wherewithal to go through the system 
twice; all too many die during the first run."). 
191. Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1997). 
192. Jd. at 451-53. 
193. Jd. at 453. 
194. Jd. 
195. Jd. at 454. 
196. Peabody Coal Co. v. Spese, 117 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1997). 
197. Jd. at 1003. 
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fication of the prior decision.198 The court then adopted the Direc­
tor's one-element standard, as articulated by the Sixth Circuit in 
Sharondale Corp. v. ROSS.199 The Peabody Coal court stated that 
the important distinction drawn in Sahara Coal was "between a sec­
ond claim that merely attempts to relitigate the first one and a gen­
uine showing of changed conditions."2oo 
In that light, the court found that the one-element test does not 
offend res judicata, so long as it respects the finality of the original 
judgment and operates under the assumption that the original judg­
ment was correct.201 Thus if the "miner must show that something 
capable of making a difference has changed," the Director's stan­
dard is the correct one.202 The Seventh Circuit held that the Direc­
tor's test was proper so long as the one element that the miner 
shows a change in might "independently have supported a deci­
sion" against that claimant in the original claim.203 
6. u.s. Steel Mining Co. v. Director, OWCp204 
In u.s. Steel Mining, the Eleventh Circuit declined to follow 
the Sahara Coal test, as urged by the coal company, finding that 
they owed deference to the Director's consistent interpretation of 
his own regulations.205 The court held that this standard was rea­
sonable and did not violate the principles of res judicata, because it 
did not require a claimant to relitigate the issues of the prior com­
plaint.206 The one-element test did not require a claimant to com­
pare "the evidence associated with the second claim with the 
evidence presented at the first claim."207 Rather, the one-element 
test required the claimant to compare new evidence with the "con­
clusions reached in the prior claim," which are final, to determine 
whether the miner's condition had changed since the prior de­
nia1.208 The court held that res judicata was not offended, and that 
198. Id. at 1005. "[It) also became clear that clarification of our Sahara Coal 
decision is desirable, as a number of our sister circuits appear to have misunderstood 
what we require to show a 'material change in conditions' for purposes of second or 
subsequent applications." Id. 
199. Id. at 1009; Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1994). 
200. Peabody Coal Co., 117 F.3d at 1007. 
201. Id. at 1008. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 1009. 
204. U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004). 
205. Id. at 984-88. 
206. Id. at 988-89. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
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the test was appropriate because this was a reasonable interpreta­
tion of the regulations and was therefore entitled to judicial 
deference.209 
III. ANALYSIS 
The proper test to determine whether a miner has had a mate­
rial change in condition, and is thus allowed to bring a duplicate or 
subsequent claim for benefits under the BLBA, is the Director's 
one-element test. The Director has promulgated regulations con­
taining this standard210 under a valid notice and comment rulemak­
ing;211 as such, the courts are bound to follow these regulations 
unless they can be set aside pursuant to the APA.212 Further, be­
cause the one-element standard does not violate the doctrine of 
claim preclusion, it is valid, and should be followed by the courts as 
having the force and effect of law. 
A. Res Judicata 
1. 	 The Tenth Circuit's Finding that the One-Element Test 
Violates Res Judicata 
Even though the Director of the OWCP has promulgated rules 
that contain the one-element test, the Tenth Circuit might continue 
to use res judicata as a means of not following the Department of 
Labor's regulations. By a finding that the one-element test violates 
the doctrine of claim preclusion, the Tenth Circuit could hold the 
standard to be "otherwise not in accordance with the law" and set it 
aside under the APA.213 This would allow the Tenth Circuit to up­
hold their precedent and would not force them to use a standard 
which they believe violates a doctrine entrenched in the law of this 
country. 
The Tenth Circuit has made perfectly clear that it feels the Di­
rector's one-element test violates the doctrine of claim preclu­
sion.214 Although the Tenth Circuit has not yet dealt with a case 
209. [d. at 990. 
210. 20 c.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006). 
211. 5 U.S.c. § 553 (2000). 
212. [d. § 706. 
213. [d. § 706(2)(A). 
214. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 89 Fed. App'x 152 (10th Cir. 
2004); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, No. 99-9562, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17415 (10th 
Cir. July 18, 2000); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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arising under the newly promulgated rules,215 those rules do not 
necessarily solve the issue of whether the Director's test will now be 
followed by the Tenth Circuit. Most of the relevant case law where 
an agency action is set aside as being not in accordance with the law 
involves the violation of a federal statute.216 However, a regulation 
that is contrary to a common law rule could also be set aside as 
being not in accordance with the law. 
Prior cases have held that an agency regulation that violates a 
common law principle would be found to be "not in accordance 
with law" and set aside under the APA.217 Furthermore, in order to 
change the common law by a statute, Congress must speak directly 
to the issue of changing that common law rule.2ls Therefore, the 
statutory grant of authority to delegate, does not speak directly to 
or evidence an intent to abrogate common law rules and must be 
read to allow the OWCP to regulate only within the realm of com­
mon law.219 As such, the Tenth Circuit could hold that the regula­
tion abrogates the principle of claim preclusion and is unlawful for 
going beyond the jurisdiction given to the OWCP by Congress.220 
2. 	 Why the One-Element Test Does Not Violate Res 
Judicata 
a. 	 The View of the Director of the OWCP 
It should not be surprising that the Director of the OWCP does 
not think that his regulations are invalid for violating the doctrine 
215. See generally Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358, 1364 (4th Cir. 
1996) (discussing the slow nature of the black lung claims process). 
216. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See generally Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 
(1979) (holding that any disclosure of information by a federal agency, that violates the 
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.c. § 1905, is not in accordance with the Freedom of Informa­
tion Act); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57 F.3d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding 
that even though the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.c. § 1905, does not confer a private 
right of action on citizens, a violation of that Act by an agency can be the basis of 
overturning action as not in accordance with law). 
217. Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (The court 
reversed the Patent Appeals Board for improperly setting aside a claim as barred by 
claim preclusion. Because the second claim was not barred by the doctrine of preclu­
sion, the agency's action was not in accordance with law, and was set aside.). 
218. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). It is a longstanding princi­
ple that statutes which invade the common law must be read narrowly, with the pre­
sumption that the common law rule is intact, unless it is clear that the legislative intent 
was to abrogate that common law principle. Id. (citing Astoria Fed. Savings & Loan 
Ass'n v. Solimimo, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991». 
219. See generally 30 U.S.c. § 921 (2000). 
220. 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(C). (A court may hold unlawful, agency action "in excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. "). 
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of claim preclusion. When the Director of the OWCP published his 
final rules in the Federal Register, he responded to the issue of claim 
preclusion and advocated that these rules do not violate that doc­
trine.221 The Director argued that these regulations do not offend 
the doctrine of res judicata because the doctrine's "applicability [to] 
these principles was limited in two important respects. "222 
First, the Director references the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act,223 which contains a liberal reopening 
provision,224 and which has been expressly incorporated into the 
BLBA by Congress.225 This reopening provision, formed by an act 
of Congress and made applicable to miners suffering from black 
lung, mitigates the effect of claim preclusion on the Director's regu­
lations by allowing a claim to be reopened on the showing of a 
change in conditions, and abrogating the common law doctrine of 
res judicata.226 The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
reopening provision of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com­
pensation Act does not violate the doctrine of claim preclusion.227 
The Court held that the relevant portion of the statute,228 which 
allows for the reopening of a claim due to a change in conditions, 
was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.229 
The Court looked to the legislative history of the Longshore 
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and found that the pur­
pose of this section of the Act was to allow for the modification of 
an award if necessary to "render justice" under the Act.230 The 
221. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,972-73 (Dec. 20, 2000) (codified at 20 C.F.R. 
§ 725.309 (2006)). 
222. Id. at 79,972. 
223. Id. (citing 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950 (2000)). 
224. 33 U.S.c. § 922 (2000). 
225. 30 U.S.c. § 932(a) (2000). 
226. 33 U.S.c. § 922. 
227. Banks v. Chi. Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 u.S. 459 (1968). 
228. The relevant portion read: 
Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the 
ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of 
fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time 
prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether 
or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year 
after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case in accordance with 
the procedure prescribed [for original claims], and in accordance with such 
section issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, rein­
state, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation. 
Id. at 462 (quoting 33 U.S.c. § 922). 
229. Id. at 465. 
230. Id. at 464. 
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Court further found that Congress had amended this provision after 
enactment in order to enlarge the time frame for modification to 
extend the authority to change awards in the interest of justice.231 
Congress clearly intended this provision of the Longshore and Har­
bor Workers' Compensation Act to allow for ample opportunity to 
modify orders, with the hopes that entitled persons would be ade­
quately compensated under the Act.232 By incorporating this provi­
sion into the BLBA, Congress has lessened the effects of claim 
preclusion, and thus attempted to ensure that entitled miners are 
compensated.233 Because Congress has acted to mitigate the effects 
of res judicata with respect to black lung compensation, the Direc­
tor of the OWCP is correct in concluding that his regulations do not 
violate res judicata,234 as it complies with the congressional man­
date of ensuring that miners entitled to benefits receive those 
benefits. 
In his notice of final rules, the Director of the OWCP made a 
second, more general, argument that his regulations do not violate 
the concepts of claim preclusion.235 The Director argued that be­
cause an individual's eligibility for benefits is not fixed at a specific 
moment in time, but changes due to the progressive nature of pneu­
moconiosis, these claims may be subject to relitigation.236 The Di­
rector stated that under the principles of claim preclusion, a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate a position in a final adjudication will pre­
clude any subsequent relitigation of issues that could have been 
raised in the originallitigation.237 However, the Director then took 
the position that the one-element standard238 embraces these 
principles. 
231. Id. at 464-65 (citing S. REP. No. 75-1988, at 8 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 75-1945, 
at 8 (1938)). 
232. See Banks, 390 U.S. at 464-65. 
233. 30 U.S.c. § 932(a) (2000); see Dir., OWCP v. Peabody Coal Co., 554 F.2d 
310,330 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that reference to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act, in the BLBA, is a general reference, and thus also encompasses 
amendments passed to the Longshore Act, after the passage of the BLBA). 
234. See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 
of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920,79,972 (Dec. 20, 2000) (codified at 20 C.F.R. 
§ 725.309 (2006)); Banks, 390 U.S. at 464-65. 
235. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,972. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. (citing Kremer v. Chern. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982); 
Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998)). 
238. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006). 
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The one-element test, in application, will only allow a miner to 
bring a subsequent claim if the material change shown is in an ele­
ment of entitlement that is subject to change.239 For example, if a 
claim is denied on the sole basis that the claimant did not work as a 
miner,240 that is a condition that is not subject to change. If the 
miner does not allege that he has since worked as a miner, then he 
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, and no sub­
sequent claim will be allowed.241 But, if the miner can show a 
change in a given condition, established by evidence of a worsening 
in that element of entitlement, he should be allowed a subsequent 
claim for benefits because he has not had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate what is essentially a new cause of action.242 The doctrine 
of res judicata is not violated under the Director's construction of 
these regulations, because Congress has limited that doctrine to a 
permissible extent and the regulations appropriately incorporate 
the doctrine.243 
b. The Third Circuit's construction of the one-element test 
In Labelle Processing Co. ,244 the Third Circuit held that the 
Director's one-element test was appropriate and did not violate the 
doctrine of claim preclusion.245 When a miner shows a material 
change in condition, a new cause of action, not barred by res judi­
cata, arises in the miner.246 Even though a subsequent claim must 
follow a previous claim, so long as a material change in condition is 
demonstrated, the second claim is not barred because the new 
cause of action is separate and distinct from the original,247 The 
Court further determined that the Director's one-element test was 
proper based on judicial deference to an agency's reasonable inter­
pretation of its own regulations.248 
The Third Circuit also discussed the progressive nature of 
pneumoconiosis at length as a reason why claim preclusion should 
not operate to bar a duplicate or subsequent claim for benefits 
239. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 




243. [d. at 79,972; 33 U.S.c. § 922 (2000). 
244. Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 1995). 
245. [d. at 313-14. 
246. [d. 
247. [d. 
248. Id. at 318. 
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under the BLBA.249 A miner whose pneumoconiosis was latent at 
the time of the original claim should be entitled to prove that his 
disease has progressed since the denial of his original claim.250 
Whether a new cause of action has arisen is typically determined by 
the "transaction" or "series of ... transactions" test, found in the 
Second Restatement of ludgments.251 In general, claims or causes 
of action that arise out of the same "nucleus of operative facts" will 
be considered barred by a previous final judgment.252 After stating 
the new facts, which arise after the original claim, such as a worsen­
ing of conditions or becoming totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, a 
new claim arises that is not precluded.253 Because the Director's 
one-element test allows a miner to relitigate his claim only on a 
showing of a worsening of conditions, once that worsening is estab­
lished, a new cause of action arises, which is not precluded by res 
judicata. 
Furthermore, the Director's one-element test is proper in light 
of the "principle that courts should liberally construe remedial leg­
islation."254 This principle has been enunciated by the Supreme 
Court and should be applied to the situation at hand.255 Because 
this statute is remedial in nature, and the Director's one-element 
test advances the remedial purposes of the BLBA, the one-element 
test should be used as it "include[s] the largest number of claimants 
within its entitlement provisions."256 
c. The Fourth Circuit's view 
In Lisa Lee Mines, the Fourth Circuit found that the Director's 
one-element test was proper and not contrary to the doctrine of 
claim preclusion.257 The one-element test does not direct that an 
original claim will be a bar to subsequent litigation, but merely acts 
as a rebuttable presumption that the original claim is final, unless a 
miner can show that his condition has changed.258 Thus, the one­
249. Id. at 314-16. 
250. Id. at 316. 
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). 
252. Id. § 24 cmt. b. 
253. Labelle Processing Co., 72 F.3d at 314. 
254. Id. at 318. 
255. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,403 (1991) (stating that courts should inter­
pret remedial statutes broadly, to reach their remedial purposes); Employer's Liab. 
Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1907), superseded by statute, on other grounds, 35 Stat. 65 (1908). 
256. Labelle Processing Co., 72 F.3d at 318. 
257. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir. 1996). 
258. Id. at 1362-63. 
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element test strikes a balance between finality and the reality that a 
human's health is subject to change.259 As such, should a miner be 
denied benefits in his original claim it is presumed that the claim 
was decided correctly and finally. However, because a person's 
health is subject to change, by showing a material change in condi­
tions, a miner should be allowed to bring a subsequent claim for 
benefits. The Director's one-element test operates as a balance be­
tween considerations of res judicata and the proposition that a per­
son's health should not be subject to a once in a lifetime 
adjudication. As such, the Director's test is appropriate and should 
be adopted by the Tenth Circuit. 
d. The Eleventh Circuit's view 
The Eleventh Circuit did not discuss the issue of claim preclu­
sion at length, basing its decision to adopt the Director's one-ele­
ment test on the grounds of deference to an agency's consistent 
interpretation of its own regulations.26o However, the court found 
that claim preclusion was not offended by the test, because it does 
not attack the finality of the original judgment, but rather uses the 
conclusions reached in that judgment as a benchmark by which to 
judge whether a material change in condition had occurred.261 The 
one-element test treats the first decision as final by adopting its 
conclusions, and then compares those conclusions to the miner's 
current state of health to determine whether a material change in 
condition has occurred.262 Because this respects the final decision 
rendered, the test does not violate the principles of res judicata. 
In fact, the Sahara Coal Co. test forces a miner to argue that 
the first denial of benefits was correct, even though he had thought 
he was entitled to benefits at that point.263 Instead of calling for the 
miner to compare the evidence presented in the first claim with the 
new evidence, the one-element test only requires that the court 
compare the new evidence with the final conclusions reached in the 
first claim.264 This "avoid[ s] forcing a miner to take a position ... 
that plainly contradicts the [position] he took in the first claim," 
259. Id. 
260. u.s. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004). 
261. Id. at 988-89. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 989. The U.S. Steel Mining Company argued before the Eleventh Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals for adoption of the Sahara Coal Co. test, rather than the Direc­
tor's one-element test. Id. at 985. 
264. Id. at 989. 
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while still treating the first adjudication as final and binding.265 As 
such, the Director's test gives finality to the original judgment, 
while taking into account the fact that a person's health is subject to 
change through the course of a progressive disease.266 
B. Mr. Murphy's Claim 
Mr. Murphy is a hypothetical miner who resides and works in 
Wyoming, a state in the Tenth Circuit. He has been denied benefits 
under his first claim and now seeks to establish that his condition 
has changed materially so that he will be allowed to make a subse­
quent claim for benefits. The Tenth Circuit requires that he show a 
material change in every element of entitlement that was decided 
against him in his original claim.267 In contrast, the Director's one­
element standard would allow Mr. Murphy to bring a subsequent 
claim for benefits on the lesser showing that he has had a material 
change in only one of the elements of entitlement previously de­
cided adversely to him.268 Although the Tenth Circuit has not yet 
decided a claim governed by the newly promulgated rules, which 
contain the one-element test, the Circuit has not abandoned its po­
sition, even when it was clear that the Director would incorporate 
his test in the Code of Federal Regulations.269 
Our hypothetical miner should begin his argument before the 
Tenth Circuit by stating that the Director's regulations, which con­
tain the one-element test, have the force and effect of law.270 While 
it is true that these regulations were promulgated by a valid notice 
and comment rulemaking,271 the Tenth Circuit may refuse to follow 
265. [d. 
266. [d. 
267. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 89 Fed. App'x 152, 156 (10th Cir. 
2004); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17415 (10th Cir. July 18, 
2000); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996). 
268. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006). 
269. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co., 89 Fed. App'x 152; see also Wyo. Fuel Co., 2000 
U.S. App. LEXIS 17415; Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and 
Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed Reg. 3338, 3351-54 (Jan. 22, 1997); Regulations 
Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 64 
Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,984-85 (Oct. 8, 1999); Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,972-73 (Dec. 
20,2000). 
270. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d); 5 U.s.c. § 553 (2000). 
271. See 5 U.S.c. § 553; 20 C.F.R. § 725.309; Regulations Implementing the Fed­
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920; Regu­
lations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as 
Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966; Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338. 
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them, on the grounds that they violate res judicata, and are thus not 
in accordance with law.272 The Tenth Circuit could also refuse to 
follow these regulations on the ground that the Director lacks the 
authority to abrogate the common law rules without the express 
permission of Congress; therefore, the regulations purporting to 
limit the effect of res judicata are in excess of his statutory jurisdic­
tion.273 The Tenth Circuit may insist that, due to the Director's lack 
of authority to abrogate res judicata, the regulations should be read 
in accordance with the doctrine of claim preclusion, and the regula­
tions are thus invalid for violation of the doctrine.274 For these rea­
sons, the fact that the Director promulgated regulations containing 
his one-element test may not completely solve Mr. Murphy's 
problems. 
If the Tenth Circuit will not uphold the regulations on the 
ground that they have the force and effect of law, Mr. Murphy 
should respond by arguing that the one-element test does not vio­
late the doctrine of claim preclusion, as the Tenth Circuit has found 
it does.275 To do so he can look to the other circuits that have up­
held the one-element test as appropriate and not in violation of that 
doctrine. He can follow the Third Circuit's reasoning that once a 
miner has shown a material change in condition by way of the one­
element test, a new cause of action accrues, which is not barred by 
res judicata.276 Furthermore, he can argue that the Third Circuit's 
construction of this purely remedial BLBA should be construed lib­
erally, so as to include the largest possible group of persons entitled 
to receive the BLBA's statutory benefits.277 In these respects, the 
one-element test does not violate res judicata, and the regulation 
has the force and effect of law, and should be applied by the Tenth 
Circuit as written. 
Mr. Murphy could also look to the Fourth Circuit's reason­
ing-that the one-element test is appropriate because the health of 
a human is not subject to a "one shot" adjudication-to persuade 
the Tenth Circuit to adopt the test.278 Furthermore, he can argue 
that the one-element test creates a rebuttable presumption of final­
272. 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(A). 
273. Id. §706(2)(C). 
274. Id. 
275. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 89 Fed. App'x 152 (10th Cir. 
2004); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, No. 99-9562,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17415 (10th 
Cir. July 18, 2000); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Oir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996). 
276. Labelle ProceSSing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 313-16 (3d Cir. 1995). 
277. Id. 
278. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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ity, by which a claimant is bound by the original decision, unless he 
can show a material change in his condition.279 The presumption 
saves the one-element test from violating res judicata, because its 
shows respect for the finality of the original judgment. Because the 
one-element test respects the finality of the original judgment, the 
only true requirement of res judicata, the test does not offend that 
principle.280 
Under the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits' analyses, Mr. Murphy 
could argue that the one-element test does not violate the doctrine 
of claim preclusion, because it does not permit a collateral attack on 
the final judgment rendered in the original denial.281 The one-ele­
ment test does not allow a claimant to relitigate the original claim, 
but merely uses the conclusions reached therein, to measure the 
miner's current medical condition, to establish whether there has 
been a material change in his condition; claim preclusion is not im­
plicated by the test.282 
Although the Tenth Circuit has not found the Director's advo­
cacy for his one-element standard persuasive in the past, Mr. Mur­
phy could use the Director's arguments found in the notice of the 
final rule.283 He could argue that Congress' incorporation of the 
reopening provision from the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act,284 into the BLBA,285 abrogates the common 
law doctrine of claim preclusion's applicability to the black lung 
benefit scheme. Because the Supreme Court has found that the ap­
plication of the reopening provision of the Longshoreman's Act, 
does not violate res judicata,286 so too should the one-element test 
be upheld as not violating the doctrine of res judicata. 
Furthermore, the one-element test should be applied due to 
the consideration it gives to the fact that pneumoconiosis is a pro­
gressive disease, the effects of which are not set at one single 
time.287 When a material change in condition is shown, the miner's 
279. Id. at 1363. 
280. See supra text accompanying notes 111-123. 
281. Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 450-51 (8th Cir. 1997); U.S. Steel 
Mining Corp. v. Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004). 
282. U.S. Steel Mining Corp., 386 F.3d 977. 
283. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,972-73 (Dec. 20, 2000). 
284. 33 U.S.c. § 922 (2000). 
285. 30 U.S.c. § 932(a) (2000). 
286. Banks v. Chi. Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459, 463-65 (1968). 
287. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,972-73. 
534 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:497 
condition is different from that litigated at the original claim, and 
he should not be barred from litigating his current condition, which 
he has not had an opportunity to litigate fairly and fully.288 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, since the one-element test has been codified in 
the Code of Federal Regulations, through valid notice and com­
ment rulemaking, it should be upheld and applied as having the 
force and effect of law. Even if the rules are not deferred to for 
that reason, the one-element test does not conflict with the doctrine 
of claim preclusion. Therefore, the one-element test ought to be 
applied by the courts in making a determination as to whether a 
miner has had a material change in his condition for the purposes of 
deciding whether or not that miner may bring a subsequent claim 
for benefits. 
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